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Abstract 
Leakage frequency of ethylene horizontal tanks and its attachments and may lead to risk accident were analyzed by SAFETI 
and LEAK quantitative risk analysis software of Norwegian DNV company. Through the simulation results of four accident 
scene, which gas leakage of the tank, tank rupture, leakage in the pipe from the tank to the pump, leakage in the pump and 
its export pipe, evaluated the effect of leakage, radiation, explosion to the staff and installations in the factory so that 
determined the risk of casualties and property loss in ethylene tank farm 
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1  Introduction 
Ethylene is a kind of colorless gas with asphyxiated ethers odor. The auto ignition temperature of this gas is about 540 , ℃
flash point is -136 , so it is an A℃ -grade dangerous material of fire. The explosion limit of ethylene is from 2.7 vol% to 36 
vol% in the air. Due to the lower explosive limits and the wider explosive range, it easy to fire or explosion once meet fire 
source [1]. Nowadays, the way of ethylene storage by spherical tank under high pressure and normal temperature or 
hypothermic freezing on abroad[2]. Ethylene storage in China mainly select spherical tank which surface area is small and 
the wall thickness is only 1/2 of the horizontal tank, but the construction technical is difficult, it has some risk.  
The safety evaluation software for quantitative risk analysis can simulation the accident probability and its damage extent 
so that selected the optimal design in order to take effective measures to reduce the destruction of life, environment and 
investment. In this paper, SAFETI and LEAK quantitative risk analysis software of Norway DNV Company were used to 
analyze a petrochemical company’s ethylene horizontal tanks and its attachments might lead the major types of accidents, 
combined with the heat flux criterion and the shock wave destruction damage criterion quantitative assessed risk of ethylene 
horizontal tanks. 
2  Project overview 
2.1  Process overview 
The ethylene horizontal tank farm of a petrochemical company is arranged by 5 side-by-sides of ethylene horizontal 
tanks and other auxiliary devices. The tank diameter is 4.65 m, the length is 80 m, and the effective volume is 1200 m3. 
Qualified ethylene from the steam cracker equipment enters the tanks STT1061, STT1062, STT1063, STT1064 and 
STT1065. Qualified and unqualified liquid ethylenes are returned to the steam cracker equipment by the pumps STP1050A / 
B and STP1051 respectively, and the vapor phase ethylene is returned directly. 
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2.2  Equipment overview 
Operating conditions of ethylene horizontal tank 
Operating pressure: 1.83 MPaG; operating temperature: -30 °C; liquid specific gravity: 0.483. 
 Designing conditions of ethylene horizontal tank 
Designing temperature: Tmin = -104 °C, Tmax = 55 °C; designing pressure: Pd = 2.3 MPaG, Pv = 0.1 MPa (vacuum); 
testing pressure: Pt = 1.25 MPaG, Pd = 2.875 MPaG; inner diameter: Di = 4650 mm, shell thickness: Sec = 30.5 mm, 
spherical head thickness: Ses = 15.2 mm, total length (to both heads of the ends): L = 80000 mm; volume: V = 1332.259 
m3,effective volume: 0.9 V = 1199.033 m3  1200 m3. 
  Pump of ethylene transfer 
The qualified ethylene pump (STP1050A, / B): Rated capacity: 65.6 m3/h; differential pressure: 0.857 MPa; power: 21 
kW. 
The unqualified ethylene pump (STP1051): Rated capacity: 200 m3/h; differential pressure: 0.388 MPa; power: 22 kW. 
3  Risk assessment of ethylene horizontal tank 
3.1  Standards of risk assessment 
Until now, there is not a risk assessment standard having been developed by the authority department in our country, so 
the LSIR and IRPA, which is worldwide generally accepted risk assessment standard, used to evaluate the risk. 
The LSIR standard of death accident risk assessment is defining the probability of all the danger of death that a person 
(or a property) continuously stays in a place, shown in Table 1[3]. The 1E-4 death / (year·person) means the fatalness by the 
death probability of one person per year, which representatives the probability of one death per year in every 10 million of 
people; to each person, the probability of death is 0.01%. 
Table 1.  The LSIR standard of death accident risk 
Description LSIR risk line in same levels Standard description 
LSIR of one death accident in 10,000 
years 1E-4 
The risk can’t be accepted outside the enterprise’s boundary. 1E-4 risk 
line in same levels shouldn’t go over the enterprise’s boundary. 
LSIR of one death accident in 100,000 
years 1E-5 
The risk can’t be accepted in business district and low hidden danger 
industrial zone. 1E-5 risk line in same levels shouldn’t enter these areas.
LSIR of one death accident in 
1,000,000 years 1E-6 
The risk can’t be accepted in housing development zone  
1E-6 risk line in same levels shouldn’t enter housing development zone.
 
Assessment of the LSIR result is strictly in accordance with the Individual Risk Standard of crowd choices formulated by 
the authorities. These standards are the sum of industrial risk that used in affecting the most dangerous individuals, 
assuming that the extent of these individuals susceptible to injury when the accident occurred is average, in the normal 
working hours, outside the doors, and trying to flee the scene. LSIR result is more conservative. It assumes that individuals 
exposed to the risk continuously stay in a designated place and can not escape nor have the measure of the protection, and 
then it is calculated. 
Personal annual risk standard IRPA is not only taking into account the time to stay in the factory, but also concerning 
about the number of people exposed to the risk, so it is suitable for assessing the acceptable level of the factory workers 
exposing in risks. Because IRPA ALARP (As Low As Reasonable Practicable) principle is also known as the lowest 
reasonably practicable principle. The maximum tolerable level of individual annual risk value is one death per thousand 
years (1 × 10-3 / year), when individual risk value is above the limits of this risk, which is intolerable, we must consider and 
take risk reduction measures. The highest level of the individual annual risk value is one death per 100,000 years (1 × 10-5 / 
year), when the individual risk value can be maintained at this grade level, we don’t need to take further risk reduction 
measures. The range between the high and low limits region is the ALARP. The risk level in the ALARP district should be 
reduced as far as possible. However, to further reduce the risk, the cost often rises exponentially[4].The ALARP triangular 
diagram below shows the IRPA standard, as in Fig. 1[5]. 
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Fig. 1.  Individual risk standard 
3.2  Risk assessment method 
Quantification risk assessment method adopted in order to quantitative grading of this system. The flowchart is as Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2  QRA flowchart. 
3.3  Risk analyses of ethylene horizontal tank 
When the tank and accessory(pipeline, flange, pump and so on) of ethylene horizontal tank reveal, if it is the reveal of 
ethylene and it meet combustion source immediately, there will generally be a fire ball. While if the reveal is through the 
small opening and meet combustion source at the same time, there will be a spray flame. If the ethylene though passion 
leakage valve doesn’t meet combustion source and it can be gathered by the let out system, then it can burn under control. If 
the ethylene enter into the atmosphere and it doesn’t meet combustion source immediately, then it will be easy to flash- 
evaporate, accumulate and steam diffuse, when it encounter the impact of delayed flame it will product poor fire ; steam 
diffusion can also product the burning of steam cloud. The burning of steam cloud can bring the fire to the point of leakage, 
consequently it forms spray fire or it forms poor fire [6].The four accident scene need to be quantitative analyzed by 
simulation results of Tank STT1050 gas leakage, Tank STT1061 rupture, Tank STT1061 to Pump STP1050 leakage of the 
entrance pipeline and Pump STP1050 leakage of the exit pipeline. 
  (1) STT1050 Tank Gas Leakage 
STT1050 tank gas leakage flash fire energy level diagram in Fig. 3, heat flux criteria of personnel injury and equipment 
damaged under the thermal radiation[7] shown in Table 2. 
Damage identification 
Rate analyses Consequence analyses 
Measure of reduce the accident rate Measure of reduce the accident 
Research of decrease risk measure 
Risk evaluate Risk unacceptable Risk unacceptable 
Intolerable area 
 
 
 
ALARP area 
 
 
Tolerable /acceptable 
standard 1E-3 per year
 
Ignorable risk 
1E-5 per year
Risk can not be accepted anywhere and need a 
fundamental transformation. 
 
Only the risk can’t be reduced or the cost of risk reduction 
measures can not be accepted, the risk can be accepted
Only when all the possible risk reduction measures through 
cost/ benefit analysis are implemented, this risk can be 
accepted. 
       No further action required 
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Fig. 3.  Gas leakage flash fire energy level diagram 
Table 2.  Heat flux criteria of personnel injury and equipment damage under the  thermal radiation 
Radiation intensity / 
(KW·m-2) 
Personal injury Equipment damage  
37.5 
1min:100% Deaths,  
10s:1% Deaths 
Equipment was severely damaged 
25.0 
1min:100% Deaths,  
10s:Seriously injured 
Flameless heat radiation for a long time the minimum energy to ignite the wood, 
equipment, steel structure deformation 
12.5 
1min:1% Deaths,  
10s:First level burn injury 
The minimum energy of a flame to ignite the wood, plastic melting minimum 
energy 
4.0 20s: Staff feel pain, it may burn, no casualties 30min glass broken  
1.6 Long time staff discomfort - 
 
Tank entrance pipeline gas leak, as from the leakage distance increases, the radiation heat flux and the degree of injury to 
people reduce gradually, about 150m outside the area is relatively safe area for personnel and property. 
  (2) STT1061 Tank Rupture 
When the fire broke out, flames spread to the STT1061 tank, fire heated the material in the tank, container rupture when 
the shell overheating. If the cracked hole is larger, the boiling materials out of the tank in instant, it may form a rising ball of 
fire, Radiation decreases with increasing distance .there is a sharp decline at the 100m, as shown in Fig. 4(a). When 
STT1061 tank rupture, the escape of liquefied petroleum gas is instantly ignited and cause a fireball. Early ignition of the 
explosion pressure curve, shown in Fig. 4(b) 
 
                 
                                           a Radiation to distance curve                           (b) Early ignition curves 
Fig. 4  Tank STT1061 rupture impact simulation diagram. 
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It can be seen from Fig.4(a) that the heat flux within scope of 100m near the tank is 450 kW·m-2, decreasing gradually as 
the distance increases. The explosion accidents in computing follow the overpressure damage failure criteria, and mainly 
three kinds of overpressure injury situation are selected. In the situation of 0.02-0.03 MPa (0.2068 bar), the overpressure 
will cause damage on the human body and cracks in the building wall or window frame, the damage radius is about 250 m; 
In the overpressure situations of 0.006-0.015 MPa (0.1379 bar), most of glass doors and windows will be broken toward the 
surface of the pressure, little damage to personnel, and the damage radius is about 375 m; 0.02068 bar overpressure 
influencing larger sphere, may cause the glass window destruction but basically no harm to personnel, and the damage 
radius is about 800 m[8]. It can be seen from Fig.4 (b) that, as the distance increases gradually, the overpressure decreases. 
The risk distance of overpressure wave to have a greater hazard to personnel and buildings will be about 250 m. Therefore, 
important production facility for the station (such as fire pump, main control room, etc.) as well as officers to concentrate on 
the place should be arranged outside the hazardous area. 
  (3) Leakage From STT1061 Tank to the STP1050 Pump Inlet Pipeline 
Analysis of Fig. 5 shows that the steam is generally spread along the pipeline after the occurrence of pipeline leakage, the 
gas concentration around the pipeline is higher. Table 4 show that flash fire fatalities range is 50% of the central area of low 
flammability limit, the lower explosion limit of ethylene personnel is 2.7 Vol%. So the dead zone is shown in the blue 
region, of which ethylene concentration is 1.35 Mol% and area is 207.40 m2. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Cloud Motion Figure of Pipeline leak of from STT1061 to the STP1050 entrance. 
 (4) STP1050 pump and export pipeline leakage  
It can be seen from Fig. 6 (a) that, due to positive pressure within the tank, gas will rush out from the tank with a certain 
velocity if the leak occurs. so at the beginning gas spread mainly along the pipeline, after a certain distance, the diffusion 
angle increases gradually. The farther away from the pipeline distance, the lower gas concentration. the fatality range is 
50% of low flammability limit in the central area. The blue region 1389 m2 is the explosion instantly personnel fatalities 
range, the green region is the fatal accidents range after 34 s from the gas spreading, an area of 2453 m2; yellow area is the 
fatal accidents range after 47s from the gas spreading, an area of 2365 m2; red area the fatal accidents range after 60s from 
the gas spreading, an area of 1085 m2. As time grows, the death of the accident the range first increases and then decreases. 
Fig. 6 (b) shows the level of atmospheric stability is D (neutral), the near surface atmosphere is weak, the degree of 
vertical movement relative vapor density of the ethylene gas (air = 1) was 2.15, the gas just leaks out with a certain velocity 
as the result of the positive pressure within the tank, the gas spread along the vertical direction progressively decelerating 
smoothly, after about 125m to reach the highest point, the vapor cloud began to decline. The gas spread along the vertical 
direction, and spread along the horizontal direction at the same time. The blue region is the explosion instantly personnel 
fatalities range, the green region is the fatal accidents range after 34.12 s from the gas spreading; yellow area is the fatal 
accidents range after 46.92 s from the gas spreading; red area the fatal accidents range after 59.72 s from the gas spreading. 
It can be seen from the figure, in the event of a large leak, the gas spreading diffusion distance vertically is less than 
horizontally spreading distance; horizontally spreading distance is increasing with the growth of time. 
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(a) The cloud trace figure of large leak occurrence               (b) The side view of a greater leakage 
Fig. 6.  Simulation diagram of STP1050 pump and export pipeline. 
3.4  Risk assessment 
Table 4 shows that the risk of death personnel in tanks area is 1E-4, 1E-5 or lower in other parts. Compared with the 
standard provided by DNV, the tank farm personnel risk is acceptable. 
Table 4.  Deaths LSIR results and risk criteria 
LSIR equivalent 
curve Risk results Risk criteria 
Annually 1E-3 The highest LSIR of death in chemical plant  The maximum acceptable risk level of the district staff in the chemical plant sector 
Annually 1E-4 Limited in the chemical plant community  Beyond the acceptable standards of residential areas. The maximum acceptable risk of the existing business district 
Annually 1E-5 
Only a small part beyond the chemical plant community area, 
but these areas no one or only a very small number of people 
living or commercial area 
The maximum acceptable risk of existing residential areas 
Annually 1E-6 Only a small part enter into the business districts or residential areas of minimal population The maximum acceptable risk of future residential areas 
 
4  Conclusions 
In this paper, based on the analysis of ethylene hazardous characteristics, type of hazardous events caused by a 
petrochemical ethylene horizontal storage tank leak including flash fire, vapor cloud explosion, BLEVE (boiling liquid 
expanding explosion) and its personnel and property the degree of potential damage were summed up and a risk assessment 
was carried out on the basis of analyzing the possible consequences of a variety of leak simulated by SAFETI quantitative 
risk assessment software. It can be seen from the evaluation results that the petrochemical ethylene risk of the horizontal 
cask area is within the acceptable range. Territories bear the highest risk of 1E-04, within the acceptable range of plant 
personnel, impacting on the surrounding devices of 1E-05 or lower which can be accept. In addition, to ensure the safety of 
the ethylene storage tank area, both ethylene storage tank leak and ignition sources have to be prevented, and the distance of 
the ethylene storage tank and its peripherals strictly controlled, to prevent secondary accidents and the associated risks. 
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